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Chapter 2
UI Reform Proposals in the Fiscal 
Year 2017 Obama Budget Request
Suzanne Simonetta
U.S. Department of Labor
The experience of the Great Depression, with unemployment rates 
reaching 25 percent in 1933, had a devastating impact at both the indi-
vidual and societal level, making it abundantly clear that the United 
States needed to establish an unemployment insurance (UI) program 
(Haber and Murray 1966). It was during this crisis that the political 
will was found to enact legislation enabling UI in the Social Security 
Act of 1935. 
The Great Recession was unquestionably the worst economic 
downturn the United States faced since the Great Depression (Good-
man and Mance 2011). The experience of the Great Recession dem-
onstrated the UI program’s success at mitigating individual economic 
insecurity (Gabe and Whittaker 2012) and providing macroeconomic 
stabilization (Kekre 2016). However, even though some of the prob-
lems outlined below developed over many decades, they were greatly 
exacerbated during and after the Great Recession and threatened 
the program’s ability to eff ectively function as a meaningful social 
insurance program. While these programmatic challenges are serious 
when the economy is growing, the weakening of the social safety net 
for jobless workers and their families could have devastating conse-
quences for local and state economies, as well as the national econ-
omy, during the next economic downturn. 
Building on the lessons learned from the past and looking to the 
future, the fi scal year (FY) 2017 Obama Budget contained a set of 
UI reform proposals aimed at addressing many of these challenges 
in order for all states to have a robust, meaningful, and genuine UI 
program with adequate resources in reserve to provide unemployed 
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workers with suffi  cient benefi ts as they seek new jobs. This chapter 
provides an overview of the UI program, defi nes the problems that 
were the basis for the UI reform proposals in the FY 2017 Obama 
Budget, describes those proposals, and explains how they were 
intended to remedy the problems.
OVERVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE1
UI is designed to provide partial, temporary income support to 
individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own. This 
program is a federal-state partnership (USDOL 2017a) based on fed-
eral law, but it is administered by states under state law. Unless there 
is an explicit requirement or prohibition in federal law, states have 
great latitude to establish the parameters of their UI programs. For 
this reason, there is much variation among the states with respect to 
qualifi cation and eligibility requirements, weekly benefi t amounts, 
number of weeks of benefi ts, disqualifi cation provisions, taxable 
wages, tax rates, and many other key policy areas (Employment and 
Training Administration [ETA] n.d.-a).
Eligibility
Determining benefi t eligibility is a multi-step process. First, UI 
applicants must have suffi  cient recent labor market attachment, mea-
sured by work experience, to qualify for UI benefi ts. New entrants to 
the labor market, reentrants after a withdrawal from the labor market, 
the self-employed, and genuine independent contractors are not eligi-
ble for UI because they have not recently worked in covered employ-
ment positions. In general, prior to becoming unemployed, applicants 
must have earned suffi  cient amounts working in covered employment 
during at least two calendar quarters in a 12-month period to qualify 
for benefi ts.2 Traditionally, states would examine earnings during the 
fi rst four of the most recently completed fi ve calendar quarters when 
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making what is called a “monetary determination.” Recognizing that 
using this period of time (i.e., the “base period”) as a basis for estab-
lishing UI eligibility does not take into account up to the most recent 
six months of an individual’s work history, many states have begun to 
use an alternative base period that examines earnings during the most 
recent four completed calendar quarters when making a monetary 
determination (Mastri et al. 2016).3
Next, a determination must be made that the applicant was sepa-
rated from employment (i.e., became unemployed) through no fault 
of their own. The classic example of this is when an employer lays 
someone off  because work is no longer available. However, under 
certain circumstances, if an individual quits or the employer fi res 
an individual they may still be eligible for benefi ts. Every state’s UI 
law defi nes what constitutes good cause for quitting (ETA 2016a). 
While all states include good cause connected with work, many states 
also include certain personal reasons in their defi nition. Similarly, 
although there are many reasons an employer may decide to fi re an 
employee, individuals generally would be disqualifi ed from receiving 
UI benefi ts only if they were fi red for work-related misconduct.
After the initial eligibility determination is made, applicants 
must demonstrate their continued attachment to the labor market by 
meeting a set of ongoing eligibility requirements each week that they 
claim benefi ts. These include being able to work, being available for 
work, and actively seeking work. Refl ecting workforce behavior from 
decades ago, even if individuals earned/worked enough in part-time 
employment to qualify for benefi ts, many states continue to require 
individuals to be available for and seek full-time work to be eligible 
for benefi ts due to the presumption that individuals who work part 
time do not have a genuine attachment to the labor market.
Financing
The UI program is funded primarily through federal and state 
taxes assessed on employers.4 In general, the Federal Unemployment 
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Tax Act (FUTA) eff ective tax rate is 0.6 percent (ETA 2016b)5 on 
the fi rst $7,000 of workers’ earnings (Griffi  n 1999).6 The full FUTA 
tax is 6.0 percent, but employers get a credit of up to 5.4 percent if 
the state’s UI law conforms to federal UI law and the state has no 
long-term outstanding federal advances (loans) to pay benefi ts. FUTA 
revenue is primarily used to pay for states’ costs in administering the 
program, benefi t costs for certain programs that extend (provide addi-
tional weeks of) benefi ts, and for advances to states that run out of 
funds to pay UI benefi ts. 
State unemployment tax revenue is used to pay for “regular” ben-
efi ts—typically up to 26 weeks of benefi ts are payable to individu-
als when they become unemployed. Some states provide a uniform 
number of weeks of benefi ts to all jobless workers who qualify. Other 
states provide a variable number of weeks of benefi ts whereby indi-
viduals with earnings throughout the base period will be eligible for 
more weeks of benefi ts than individuals with earnings during only a 
small part of the base period. The unemployment tax rates and the 
amount of wages that are subject to state unemployment taxation 
vary signifi cantly among the states. In addition, in all states, the state 
unemployment tax rate assigned in a given year varies from employer 
to employer based on the employer’s experience with unemployment 
(i.e., “experience rating”). Employer accounts are “charged” for ben-
efi t payments made to their former employees, and these charges are 
factored in when determining employer tax rates in subsequent years. 
In general, employers that have more former employees who receive 
UI benefi ts pay higher state unemployment taxes than employers with 
lower UI benefi t costs associated with their former employees. 
The range of applicable state unemployment tax rates varies from 
year to year depending on the reserves the state has in its account in 
the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) to pay future benefi ts. When 
the economy is strong, trust fund balances increase because there are 
more employers paying taxes on more employees’ wages while fewer 
benefi t payments are made. If the state’s trust fund account balance 
exceeds certain levels, the range of applicable rates decreases in the 
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following year because less revenue needs to be raised. When the 
economy declines, trust fund balances decrease because benefi t pay-
ments go up as layoff s increase and tax revenue decreases as fewer 
employers pay unemployment taxes on the wages of fewer employ-
ees. If the state’s trust fund account balance goes below specifi ed lev-
els, the range of applicable rates increases in the next year so that 
more funds will be collected to pay for benefi ts. Thus, not only will 
state unemployment tax rates vary from employer to employer based 
on their experience with unemployment, rates also will vary from 
year to year based on the state’s reserves in the UTF.
Advances
Unemployment Insurance is, as its name implies, a social insur-
ance program paid as a matter of right to all individuals who meet its 
requirements. If a state runs out of funds to pay benefi ts, the state may 
borrow from the federal government7 to continue to meet its obliga-
tions to all eligible unemployed workers. Federal advances accrue 
interest under certain circumstances. Since states may not use trust 
fund dollars to pay this interest, many states assess a separate tax on 
employers to cover this cost. Also, in general, should a state have 
outstanding federal advances as of January 1 on two consecutive cal-
endar years, its employers’ FUTA tax credit will begin to be reduced, 
with the resulting additional revenue being used to pay back the fed-
eral debt.8 States may avoid the credit reduction or reduce it if cer-
tain requirements are met.9 In short, sustained insolvency results in 
marked increases in employers’ total unemployment-related costs—
the schedule of applicable state tax rate increases and/or a solvency 
add-on tax may be triggered, additional state taxes to pay interest may 
be assessed, and net federal unemployment taxes may increase to pay 
down the outstanding federal advances to the state to pay benefi ts. 
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Solvency
Maintaining suffi  cient reserves of benefi t funding is essential to 
mitigate the likelihood of large fl uctuations in employers’ state UI tax 
liability from year to year, with especially large increases needed if 
the economy is recovering from a recession. Hence, states are encour-
aged to forward-fund their accounts in the UTF (U.S. Advisory Coun-
cil on Unemployment Compensation 1996). The average high cost 
multiple (AHCM) measures state solvency. Using data from the most 
recent three recessions to determine high benefi t costs in a state, the 
AHCM measures how long the state could pay benefi ts when benefi t 
payment levels are high given the state’s current balance in the UTF. 
Although it is recommended that states maintain trust fund balances 
suffi  cient to pay benefi ts for one year at recessionary levels, there 
is no federal requirement concerning state solvency.10 Because states 
have great latitude when designing their UI tax structures and the 
revenues they are expected to yield, some states have opted to follow 
more of a “pay as you go” model that keeps employer taxes low but 
does not generate enough revenue to build signifi cant reserves for 
use during the next economic downturn. As explained above, this can 
result in greater volatility in the state and federal unemployment tax 
payments that employers are required to make.
Extended Benefi ts
Recognizing that during recessionary periods regular state UI 
benefi ts provide insuffi  cient income support for many unemployed 
workers, the federal-state Extended Benefi ts (EB) program is intended 
to provide for additional weeks of UI benefi ts when unemployment 
is high and rising.11 Benefi t costs are shared equally by the state and 
federal government.12 EB is “triggered” when states’ unemployment 
rates exceed certain levels and are higher than they had been in recent 
years. All states must have an EB trigger based on the insured unem-
ployment rate (IUR), which is based on data concerning individuals 
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who are currently receiving regular UI benefi ts. To trigger on, the 
13-week IUR must be at least 5 percent and be at least 120 percent 
of the rate for the equivalent 13-week period in each of the preceding 
two calendar years. Under the IUR trigger, individuals may receive 
up to 13 additional weeks of benefi ts. If a state uses an optional total 
unemployment rate (TUR) trigger, which uses the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ (BLS) household survey data about individuals who are 
not working and have looked for work during the last four weeks, 
individuals may receive up to 13 or 20 weeks of additional benefi ts, 
depending on the state’s TUR. Up to 13 weeks of benefi ts would be 
available if the state’s three-month TUR is at least 6.5 percent and 
at least 110 percent of the rate for the corresponding three-month 
period in either of the two previous calendar years. A total of up to 20 
weeks of benefi ts would be available if the state’s three-month TUR 
is at least 8.0 percent and the rate meets the 110 percent “lookback” 
requirement. Because these triggers are not very responsive to eco-
nomic downturns and states historically have not been triggering EB 
during recessions (or not triggering on soon enough), especially via 
the IUR trigger, special federal programs have been created to pro-
vide additional weeks of benefi ts to unemployed workers.
Reemployment
Although providing benefi ts to individuals unemployed through 
no fault of their own is the overall mission of the UI program, there 
has been an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of helping 
individuals who receive UI benefi ts to become reemployed since the 
program’s inception. Whereas some workers maintain their attach-
ment to their jobs (i.e., they are on a temporary layoff ), most do not. 
It is for this reason that federal law requires UI payments to be made 
through public Employment Offi  ces.13 Thus, in the past, when unem-
ployed workers had to go in person to apply for UI benefi ts, those 
who were not job attached would be referred for assistance fi nding 
work to the Employment Service, which was colocated with local UI 
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offi  ces. As UI claims taking moved out of local offi  ces in the 1990s 
and was increasingly handled over the phone or via the Internet, the 
connection to public Employment Offi  ces weakened in some states. 
To strengthen this connection, several strategies have been imple-
mented, including the development of the UI Reemployment and 
Eligibility Assessment (REA) program. Since 2005, funds have been 
appropriated to the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) to enable 
states to address the individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, 
and to prevent and detect improper benefi t payments by reviewing 
their eligibility for benefi ts (ETA 2016c). The results have been posi-
tive with respect to reducing the number of weeks claimed and com-
pensated, the likelihood of exhausting UI benefi ts, and improper pay-
ments (Benus et al. 2008). Due to its early successes, REA funding 
was increased. The program was renamed Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA), which refl ects a narrower 
focus on individuals who are most likely to be long-term unemployed 
(and on those who transitioned out of the military). Recognizing 
the need for increased reemployment services for these individuals, 
RESEA funding may now be used for this purpose. In February 2018, 
explicit permanent statutory authority for RESEA was included in the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.
Short-Time Compensation
When tackling the problem of unemployment, increasing empha-
sis has been given to implementing strategies that avoid layoff s. 
Starting in 1982, federal UI law permitted states to experiment with 
short-time compensation (STC), also known as work sharing, which 
provides a partial UI weekly payment to certain individuals whose 
work hours were reduced.14 This is noteworthy because such indi-
viduals normally wouldn’t be eligible for any weekly UI payment 
because they earned too much money. Authority to run STC programs 
became permanent in 1992.15 While not all states operate STC pro-
grams, there has been increasing recognition of its value. By reducing 
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hours of work for a group of employees rather than laying off  a por-
tion of them, employers maintain their skilled workforce and no one 
loses their job. The workers meanwhile experience a smaller reduc-
tion in their earnings because they receive a reduced UI payment. For 
these reasons, STC is considered a win-win situation.16,17 Interest in 
STC heightened during the Great Recession, and the Middle Class 
Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 included several provisions 
designed to encourage more states to enact STC laws and for existing 
STC states to expand their programs (ETA n.d.-b). These provisions 
include two measures: 1) reimbursing states for up to three years of 
STC benefi t costs, and 2) providing grants to states for implemen-
tation or improved administration of STC programs and for promo-
tion of and enrollment of employers in STC programs. Sixteen states 
received grant funds totaling $46,154,004. As a result of these off er-
ings, the STC program has grown and strengthened (Bennicci and 
Wandner 2015). 
Integrity
An operational area that has received increasing attention and 
emphasis in recent years concerns integrity.18 This is a broad under-
taking that includes eff orts to ensure that employers are paying the 
proper amount of unemployment taxes as well as eff orts to prevent, 
detect, and recover improper benefi t payments. These eff orts have 
been central to the UI program for quite some time, but new chal-
lenges have arisen as the claim-taking process moved out of local 
offi  ces due to advances in technology. These technological advances, 
however, have also provided more tools to help states in their eff orts 
to combat these challenges. For example, states cross-match claim 
information with information in their state directories of new hires for 
the purpose of fi nding individuals who continue to claim UI benefi ts 
after they return to work. In addition, under certain limited circum-
stances, states may recover improper UI benefi t payments by off set-
ting federal income tax refunds due to the individual.
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DATA: A SNAPSHOT OF THE PROGRAM19
The UI reform proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget addressed 
several key policy areas: solvency, benefi t adequacy, extended ben-
efi ts, reemployment, short-time compensation, and integrity. Before 
discussing the specifi cs of these proposals, it is essential to provide 
both the high-level context and a broad description of the state of the 
UI program, which help defi ne the problems that the proposals were 
designed to address.
Unemployment
Unemployment is a lagging indicator, so the national TUR peaked 
in June 2009 as the Great Recession ended (Figure 2.1). As economic 
recovery continued, job growth exceeded and TUR dropped below 
prerecessionary levels. These data are quite compelling, but they do 
not tell the entire story (BLS 2009).
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Although the economy continued growing and there were increas-
ing opportunities for workers, signifi cant challenges remained. For 
example, consistent with changes at the national level, TUR declined 
in most states (Figure 2.2), but it remained markedly higher than the 
national average in some states. In addition, long-term unemployment 
remained a persistent challenge (Ghayad 2013) even as economic 
recovery continued (Figure 2.3). For example, in September 2016, 
24.9 percent of the unemployed (2.0 million people) had been unem-
ployed for more than 27 weeks. 
UI Benefi ts
Consistent with the long-term unemployment data, the average 
number of weeks an individual receives UI benefi ts (i.e., “duration”) 
Figure 2.2  Unemployment Rates by State








NOTE: Inset maps not to scale.
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increased. Historically, the average duration of UI benefi t receipt has 
varied consistently with changes in TUR, but the average duration 
of UI benefi t receipt did not decline as much as would have been 
expected when TUR declined (Figure 2.4). There are many possible 
reasons for this, including insuffi  cient job growth, proportionately 
more permanent layoff s, and a mismatch between worker skills and 
emerging employer needs. 
When an individual initially establishes eligibility for UI benefi ts, 
the state UI agency issues a “fi rst payment.” As expected, the number 
of fi rst payments has varied, consistent with changes in TUR (Figure 
2.5). However, increasingly, the percentage of individuals who were 
eligible for and claimed UI benefi ts (i.e., claimants) and who received 
everything to which they were entitled (i.e., they “exhausted” ben-
efi ts) did not track with changes in TUR and exceeded the exhaustion 
rates of prior recessions (Figure 2.6). This was probably due to both 
SOURCE: USDOL/BLS data.
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2.0 million people
Unemployed over 27 weeks
Unemployed under 27 weeks
Last data point: September 2016
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NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.













































Last data point: September 2016
NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
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the increase in long-term unemployment and the fact that, with the 
maximum number of weeks of UI benefi ts having been cut in several 
states (see Table 2.1), individuals exhausted benefi ts earlier in their 
unemployment spell than they previously would have.
Evidence of the declining role of the program can be found when 
comparing UI claims data with the size of the civilian labor force and 
the TUR. The number of weeks of UI benefi ts claimed is expected 
to vary cyclically as TUR rises and falls. However, it would also be 
expected that, as the civilian labor force increases and with every-
thing else being equal, the number of weeks of regular UI benefi ts 
claimed would increase because the pool of workers who may lose 
their jobs is increasing. However, as Figure 2.7 shows, this has not 
been the case. The trend in weeks of regular UI benefi ts claimed, 
other than the spikes during recessionary periods, is fl at. Overall, the 










































Last data point: September 2016
NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
Figure 2.6  Exhaustion Rate in the Regular Program
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When data about the percentage of unemployed workers who 
received UI benefi ts (i.e., the “recipiency rate”) are examined, it 
becomes increasingly evident that, over time, fewer unemployed 
workers have been accessing UI benefi ts when they lose their jobs 
(Figure 2.8). As noted earlier, not everyone who loses their job is eli-
gible for benefi ts. It would be expected that when the economy is in a 
downturn, layoff s become the dominant form of unemployment, and 
proportionately fewer individuals will become unemployed because 
they were fi red for misconduct connected with work or because they 






AR 7/27/11 26 25
7/15/15 25 20
FL 1/1/12 26 12–23a
GA 7/1/12 26 14–20a
ID 7/1/16 26 20–26a
IL 1/1/12 26 25b
KS 1/1/14 26 16–26a
MI 1/15/12 26 20
MO 4/17/11 26 20
1/16/16 20 13–20a
NC 7/1/13 26 12–20a
PA 1/1/13 16 or 26 18–26c
SC 6/19/11 26 20
a The number of weeks is tied to the unemployment rate.
b In Illinois, the number of weeks for 2012 was reduced to 25. For 2013, both the 
taxable wage base and the duration would have remained in place unless the state 
generated suffi  cient revenue to overcome a 2011 loss to the unemployment fund. 
Since Illinois generated suffi  cient revenue to overcome the loss, the benefi t cut to 25 
weeks only applied to 2012. The number of weeks increased to 26 weeks in January 
2013 and has not changed.
c The number of weeks of benefi ts is equal to the number of credit weeks, up to a 
maximum of 26. Claimants with fewer than 18 credit weeks are not entitled to any 
benefi ts.
SOURCE: USDOL, Division of Legislation.
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NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
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quit their jobs without good cause. Thus, recipiency rates would 
increase during recessions because proportionately more individuals 
become unemployed because they were laid off  (i.e., because of a 
lack of work). However, as shown in Figure 2.8, the UI recipiency 
rate nationwide plummeted to less than 30 percent and was lower 
than it had been at similar points during economic recoveries in recent 
decades.
State-level data are even more striking. Because states have much 
discretion with respect to determining who is potentially eligible for 
UI benefi ts, it is not surprising that there is huge variation among the 
states with respect to recipiency rates. As shown in Figure 2.9, in the 
second quarter of calendar year 2016, the range of recipiency rates 
among the states went from less than 10 percent to more than 65 per-
cent, with a national average of 28.6 percent.
Figure 2.9  Recipiency Rates by State (Insured Unemployed/Total 
Unemployed), Second Quarter 2016
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UI Taxes and Solvency
The UI program is intended to operate counter-cyclically, with 
benefi t payments increasing during economic downturns and fund-
ing reserves being built up when unemployment is low. Figure 2.10 
shows how state tax rates, contributions (taxes) collected, and ben-
efi ts paid varied since 2000 and the impact these factors had on trust 
fund balances. During the Great Recession, when trust fund balances 
were negative, most states borrowed from the federal government. In 
total, 36 states borrowed and the peak amount of the advances was 
$47.2 billion (Figure 2.11). 
The primary reason for this impact on the trust fund was the 
severity of the Great Recession—some states would have become 
insolvent no matter how well they prepared in advance. However, 
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI, USDOL/BLS, U.S. Bureau of Public Debt data.
Figure 2.10  Contributions Collected, Regular Benefi ts Paid, Tax Rate on 
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Benefits paid
Tax rate on taxable wages
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the data demonstrate that had more states achieved an adequate level 
of solvency beforehand, fewer states would have run out of benefi t 
funds and borrowing levels would have been much lower for the 
states whose economies were hard hit by the recession. The AHCM is 
the federal measure of state solvency, where an AHCM of 1.0 means 
that a state has a trust fund balance suffi  cient to pay benefi ts for one 
year during a recessionary period.20 Only about one-third of the states 
had an AHCM of at least 1.0 when the recession began (Figure 2.12). 
There were a few states that met this solvency standard that still bor-
rowed from the federal government to pay UI benefi ts, but most of the 
states that borrowed did not meet the standard (Figure 2.13).
Between the economic recovery and the actions states took to 
increase revenue and decrease expenditures, there have been marked 
improvements in solvency in recent years. However, as of 2015 a 
couple of states still had outstanding UI debt, and most states (includ-
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI, USDOL/BLS, U.S. Bureau of Public Debt data.
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NOTE: An AHCM of 1.0 (the gray line) means that a state has a trust fund balance suf-
fi cient to pay benefi ts for one year during a recessionary period.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data.
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ing all large states) did not have an AHCM of at least 1.0, calling into 
question their readiness for the next recession (Figure 2.14). 
UI Benefi t Adequacy
Although there are no federal standards regarding the adequacy 
of UI benefi ts, there has been a long-standing recommendation that 
the weekly benefi t amount (WBA) replace at least 50 percent of lost 
earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum WBA equal to 
two-thirds of the state’s average weekly wage (AWW) (U.S. Advi-
sory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1996). At the national 
level, not only has that recommendation not been met during the last 
40 years, there is a long-term declining trend in the replacement rate 
(Figure 2.15).
Another way to examine benefi t adequacy is to examine recipi-
ency rates (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). Of the many factors that infl uence 
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this rate, UI eligibility requirements, disqualifi cation provisions, 
and the number of weeks of benefi ts available are among the most 
important. In recent years, several states enacted laws (ETA n.d.-c) 
that restrict access to the program in a multitude of ways, includ-
ing raising qualifying earnings requirements, broadening the scope of 
what constitutes misconduct connected with work, and increasing the 
requirements needed to overcome a disqualifi cation and reestablish 
eligibility for UI benefi ts. In addition, several states cut the maximum 
number of weeks of UI benefi ts (Table 2.1). In the past, states gen-
erally off ered up to 26 weeks of benefi ts. About one-quarter of the 
states now off er fewer than 26 weeks. In several states, the maximum 
available depends on the unemployment rate. For example, in North 
Carolina, as few as 12 weeks of benefi ts will be available under cer-
tain circumstances.
NOTE: AHCM: Average high cost multiple. Inset maps not to scale.
Figure 2.13  States Borrowing from the Federal Government to Pay UI 
Benefi ts During the Great Recession 
State Borrowing
No advances
Advances - AHCM < 1.0
Advances - AHCM > 1.0
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As should be evident from the above discussion, the UI program 
has deviated from historical standards and its original goals, resulting 
in an erosion of the social safety net for jobless workers. The propos-
als detailed in the following section were designed to address several 
of the most important causes of these problems.
BUDGET PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS21
Solvency 
From the brief examination of the data in the previous section, 
it should be clear that states are not prepared for the next reces-
sion because they don’t have suffi  cient funds to pay benefi ts when 
demands are high. Most states’ UTF accounts do not meet the federal 
NOTE: An AHCM of 1.0 (the gray line) means that a state has a trust fund balance suf-
fi cient to pay benefi ts for one year during a recessionary period.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data.
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solvency recommendation. The FY 2017 Obama Budget recognized 
the importance of states having suffi  cient reserves to pay benefi ts, 
to avoid borrowing, and to avoid large increases in employer taxes 
when economic conditions are weak or recovering, so it included a set 
of legislative proposals to address solvency. First, in 2017, it would 
have restored the 0.2 percent FUTA surtax, which would help the fed-
eral accounts in the UTF pay their outstanding debts. For example, as 
of November 10, 2016, the Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account owed $7.2 billion to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury 
and $7.5 billion to the Federal Unemployment Account. Since the 
amount of wages subject to unemployment taxation at the state level 
is closely related to the corresponding amount at the federal level, 
there was also a proposal to increase the federal taxable wage base to 
$40,000 in 2018 (at present, it is $7,000) and to index it to infl ation in 
subsequent years. By itself, this would have a limited eff ect on state 
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data.
Figure 2.15  Average Weekly Benefi t, Average Weekly Wage, and UI 
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solvency, but it was expected that the change would encourage states 
to take action to improve their solvency. However, it would have 
more equitably allocated the tax burden among employers. When a 
taxable wage base is low, employers with more low-wage or part-time 
workers pay unemployment taxes on a larger portion of employee 
earnings than employers with more high-wage or full-time workers. 
An additional proposal would have required states to impose a 
minimum tax per employee equal to 0.175 percent of taxable wages, 
thereby spreading the cost of UI more widely among all employers.22 
At present, many states allow a signifi cant portion of employers with 
the best unemployment “experience” to pay a zero tax rate. Not only 
does this hamper eff orts to improve solvency, but it undermines the 
fundamental principle of insurance—paying a premium to insure 
against the risk of an event occurring, in this case, the risk of unem-
ployment. As it is for other types of insurance, premiums refl ect the 
likelihood of an event happening. However, contributions are made 
on behalf of everyone covered by the insurance because everyone has 
the benefi t of potential access to funds if the insured event occurs. 
Another proposal to help states attain solvency in the FY 2017 
budget was to reduce the FUTA credit available to employers when 
a state had an AHCM of less than 0.5 on January 1 in two consecu-
tive years, with the additional amounts paid being used to bolster 
the state’s account in the UTF. This process would be similar to that 
used to reduce FUTA credit to help states pay back their outstanding 
advances to pay UI benefi ts. 
To avoid a massive federal tax increase when the federal taxable 
wage base increases, the proposal would have decreased the eff ec-
tive FUTA tax rate to 0.167 percent. However, FUTA revenue would 
have gradually increased over time as the federal taxable wage base 
increased after indexing. This would have mitigated the likelihood of 
future borrowing from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury, because 
the administrative and benefi ts costs paid from the federal accounts in 
the UTF would increase over time as well.
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Benefi t Adequacy
As described above, UI claims have plummeted. They have 
reached the lowest level since the 1970s. For example, in October 
2016, initial claims were below 300,000 for more than 85 consecu-
tive weeks—the longest streak since 1970 (USDOL 2016). Although 
much of the reduction in claims is due to improving economic con-
ditions, actions by several states to cut benefi ts and restrict eligibil-
ity also were factors. For this reason, the FY 2017 Obama Budget 
included a set of proposals designed to expand access to UI benefi ts 
and services. First, it would have established the following federal 
requirements:
• States must provide at least 26 weeks of benefi ts for the regu-
lar program.23 
• States must adopt the following three provisions for which UI 
Modernization incentive payments were made available under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA):
 1) Use an alternative base period.
 2) Allow benefi ts to individuals who seek part-time 
employment.
 3) Allow unemployed workers to be eligible for benefi ts if 
they leave their jobs for family reasons.
Increasing the number of weeks of benefi ts back to the historic 
norm is important because it takes time for an individual to fi nd a 
job, even in a good economy. Moreover, it is benefi cial to both the 
individual worker and the economy as a whole if workers are able 
to take the time to fi nd jobs that align well with their skills, educa-
tion, and experience. These workers would be able to increase their 
contributions to society, as well as better provide for themselves and 
their families. Additional weeks of UI benefi ts would also result in 
increased macroeconomic stabilization.
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To understand the importance of the alternative base period pro-
posal, it is important to note the history and evolution of monetary 
determinations. Before employers began reporting their employees’ 
quarterly earnings to the states (ETA 1984), the UI base period used to 
determine whether an individual earned enough to qualify for benefi ts 
was generally the most recent 52 weeks before the individual fi led a 
claim. Although this procedure was more administratively challeng-
ing because states had to contact employers to get this information 
about each individual applying for UI benefi ts, it more accurately 
captured the individual’s recent attachment to the workforce. When 
states transitioned to establishing eligibility based on quarterly wage 
reports, administrative necessity forced states to use more remote 
work experience when making this determination. Before electronic 
reporting was possible, employers had to mail paper copies of wage 
information. Given the lag between when a calendar quarter ended 
and when the state could reasonably expect to have wage information 
from most employers, states opted to consider wages earned during 
the fi rst four of the most recent fi ve completed calendar quarters. As 
technology has advanced and employers report increasingly sooner 
after the end of the calendar quarter, this administrative constraint 
has largely disappeared. Therefore, administrative issues such as this 
should no longer be the deciding factor for a UI benefi t eligibility 
requirement. Using the most recent available reported earnings data 
more accurately measures a worker’s present attachment to the work-
force and should be the basis for determining who qualifi es for UI 
benefi ts (Carr 2016). As of 2016, 37 states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands already used alternative base 
periods when making monetary determinations (ETA 2016b).
The remaining proposed requirements were designed to help the 
UI program better refl ect the twenty-fi rst century economy. In the 
1930s, the single breadwinner model was typical for most families—
very diff erent from today’s conditions. With that construct in mind, 
and with the intent to design a program that provided benefi ts only 
to individuals who became and remained unemployed involuntarily, 
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individuals who left their jobs for personal reasons or who were only 
working part time were not considered to be genuinely attached to the 
labor force. While the risk that is insured by the UI program today 
remains the same—involuntary unemployment—the way in which 
that concept is defi ned should be reexamined. In particular, with an 
increasing number of two-earner families, the meaning of labor-force 
attachment has changed. For example, it is hard to argue that quitting 
a job to move across the country when a spouse’s job necessitates the 
move is voluntary. Maintaining a family unit is paramount and does 
not equate with a decision to leave the workforce. In this type of cir-
cumstance, since the individual’s employer did not cause the unem-
ployment, the UI benefi ts paid may be “non-charged” (i.e., won’t be 
taken into account when determining the employer’s state unemploy-
ment tax rate).24 However, denying benefi ts to such individuals would 
be inconsistent with the goals of the UI programs and the values of 
our society.
Similarly, regardless of economic necessity or overall preference, 
the demands of family life or older workers’ transition to retirement25 
often require some individuals to work part time. This does not auto-
matically equate with a weak or casual connection to the workforce. 
For this reason, if individuals earn enough to qualify for UI benefi ts 
and meet all other requirements, making them ineligible because they 
are only available for part-time work also would be out of line with 
the principles upon which the UI program is based (Michaelides and 
Mueser 2009). 
The FY 2017 Obama Budget also provided for a new $5 billion 
Modernization Fund. To become eligible for its share of funds, a state 
would have had to:
• allow for broader federal access to wage records;
• adopt employer electronic fi ling and/or increased penalties for 
employer nonreporting; and
• have a defi nition of “misconduct” that conforms to a USDOL 
model.
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In recent years, UI wage records are increasingly being used 
to evaluate and measure the performance of a vast array of public 
programs. Evidence-based decision making regarding investment 
of public funds requires access to high-quality, comprehensive data, 
which is why the fi rst two prerequisites were chosen.
When determining whether individuals became unemployed 
through no fault of their own, the state must decide whether the rea-
son an employee was fi red was “misconduct connected with work,” 
which would disqualify them from receiving benefi ts—typically for 
their entire spell of unemployment. Although there are many reasons 
why an employer may legitimately and legally fi re a worker, only a 
small subset of those reasons would constitute misconduct connected 
with work. Historically, states generally defi ned misconduct con-
nected with work narrowly in line with the defi nition in Boynton Cab 
Co. V. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249 (Wis. 1941):
[T]he intended meaning of the term “misconduct”. . . is lim-
ited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of 
an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violations or 
disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the 
right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence 
of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, 
wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and 
substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or the employ-
ee’s duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand, 
mere ineffi  ciency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good per-
formance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies 
or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors 
in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed “misconduct” 
within the meaning of the statute.
Some states have signifi cantly broadened the defi nition of mis-
conduct connected with work, which has had the eff ect of disqualify-
ing more workers from receiving UI benefi ts. To be eligible for its 
share of the Modernization Fund, a state’s defi nition would have to 
conform to the federal defi nition. 
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In addition to the prerequisite requirements, to receive a Mod-
ernization Fund payment, states would have had to adopt one benefi t 
expansion and two pro-work reforms. The benefi t expansions were:
 1) allow more individuals to receive UI benefi ts while partici-
pating in training;
 2) provide a maximum WBA equal to at least two-thirds of the 
state’s AWW during the most recent 12 months; or
 3) improve eligibility for temporary workers.
Recognizing that training may increase the likelihood of reem-
ployment and the quality of the job obtained, federal UI law prohib-
its states from making individuals ineligible because they are not 
available for work or actively seeking work while they are in train-
ing approved by a state agency.26 States would have sole authority to 
determine which types of training to approve for this purpose, but this 
proposal would have given states an incentive to expand the scope of 
training they approve.
The formula established in many states’ UI laws to determine the 
WBA is generally designed to replace one-half of a worker’s weekly 
wage (ETA 2016c). This amount helps jobless workers meet the 
necessities of life without providing a disincentive to work (Chetty 
2008). However, regardless of the WBA the formula would gener-
ate based on an individual’s wage history, the maximum amount is 
capped. In some states, the maximum WBA is a fi xed amount that can 
only be changed by enacting a state law. In other states, the maximum 
WBA changes each year because it is set as a specifi ed percentage of 
the AWW. Ensuring that the maximum WBA increases are consistent 
with increases to the state AWW avoids an erosion of benefi ts, par-
ticularly for middle income workers. 
Some states establish additional requirements in order for tem-
porary workers to be eligible for UI benefi ts. The FY2017 Obama 
Budget was designed to ensure that such requirements didn’t become 
a barrier to temporary workers getting benefi ts.
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States would have had to adopt two of the following fi ve pro-
work reforms to qualify for an incentive payment:
 1) progressively more intense reemployment service delivery 
as duration of benefi t receipt lengthens;
 2) improved reemployment services for UI claimants;
 3) subsidized temporary work programs;
 4) relocation assistance coupled with individual case manage-
ment, in-person career counseling, provision of customized 
information about job opportunities, and referrals to suit-
able work; or
 5) improved data systems for workforce and education pro-
gram performance, research, and evaluation purposes.
From its inception, the UI program has been closely tied to the 
U.S. Employment Service27 because, unless workers are on a tem-
porary layoff , it is imperative to help them fi nd jobs, which is the 
rationale for the fi rst two options. The next two options represent 
alternative ways to help individuals fi nd work—via temporary work 
programs and relocation. The last pro-work choice was premised on 
workforce and education programs becoming more eff ective at giving 
people the knowledge and skills they needed to become reemployed 
if data were used more eff ectively when evaluating, researching, and 
assessing the performance of these programs.
Extended Benefi ts
EB does not function eff ectively because it doesn’t trigger on soon 
enough (or at all) in states with high unemployment. Since its incep-
tion in 1970, special federal programs providing additional weeks of 
benefi ts were created during each major downturn and were eff ective 
during the periods 1972 to 1973, 1975 to 1978, 1982 to 1985, 1991 to 
1994, 2002 to 2004, and, most recently, 2008 to 2013 (ETA n.d.-d). 
Implementing these temporary federal programs poses several chal-
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lenges. Foremost of these, it takes too long. It takes several months 
for suffi  cient economic information to become available to demon-
strate need and design an extension program; legislation to be drafted, 
passed by Congress, and enacted into law; the USDOL to develop 
operating instructions and guidance; and the states to implement the 
new program. In addition, in these temporary federal programs, some 
portion of the benefi ts is generally available in all states, rather than 
targeting all benefi ts only to the states experiencing higher unemploy-
ment. Moreover, without knowing the program parameters of a new 
extension, states do not have suffi  cient time to prepare to implement 
and administer these special federal programs, which leads to further 
delays, public confusion, and occasionally errors. In short, while pro-
viding vital benefi ts to jobless workers and their families, these ad 
hoc programs do not provide for effi  cient and timely macroeconomic 
stabilization.
To obviate the need for hurried enactment of temporary federal 
UI extension programs, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included a pro-
posal to reform the EB program. Specifi cally, it would have:
• Provided for four 13-week tiers of benefi ts, with availability 
depending on the state’s TUR.
• Provided permanent 100 percent federal funding of EB with 
nonrepayable advances from the General Fund if there were 
insuffi  cient amounts in the federal account in the UTF.
• Established new TUR trigger thresholds of 6.5, 7.5, 8.5, and 
9.5 percent. These thresholds would have been met if the 
state’s TUR met or exceeded one of those levels or if the total 
of the state’s TUR and the change in the TUR from a com-
parable period in one of the previous two years equaled or 
exceeded one of those levels.
• Required reemployment services and eligibility assessments 
for all EB claimants. 
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These proposals drew largely on experience from the Great 
Recession—not just with EB, but also with the Emergency Unem-
ployment Compensation (EUC) program (ETA n.d.-e). At its peak, 
EUC was a four-tiered program providing up to 53 weeks of benefi ts, 
depending on the state’s TUR. After the federal account ran out of 
funds to pay for EUC, it was paid with funds from General Revenue 
that did not have to be repaid.28 The triggers changed over time. Most 
recently, Tier 1 had no trigger, and Tier 2 triggered on in states with 
a three-month TUR of at least 6.0 percent. For Tier 3, the rate was at 
least 7.0 percent, and for Tier 4, it was 9.0 percent.
The EB triggers failed for several reasons. First, even with the 
TUR-based triggers, it took too long for EB to become available in 
many states. The EUC program was fi rst enacted in June 2008, six 
months after the Great Recession began.29 In January 2009, most 
states still  hadn’t triggered onto EB—more than one year after the 
recession began (ETA n.d.-f). Related to this concern is that too few 
states had a TUR trigger in their laws before the recession began. One 
of the most important EB-related provisions in ARRA was temporary 
100 percent federal funding of EB.30 As a result of the 100 percent 
federal funding, 29 states amended their EB laws to provide for tem-
porary TUR triggers conditioned on 100 percent federal funding. The 
fi nal negative consequence of the design of the EB triggers is the fact 
that states with sustained high unemployment eventually triggered off  
EB. To remain on EB, a state’s TUR must not only meet or exceed 
certain levels, but the rate had to be higher than it had been during 
comparable periods in the prior year or two. With the impact of the 
Great Recession lasting for such a long time, the unemployment rates 
in some states, while high, were not higher than they had been dur-
ing the previous two years. Even though federal law was amended to 
allow states to use a three-year “lookback,” and 33 states amended 
their laws to provide for it, the longer lookback eventually became 
insuffi  cient, and this component resulted in EB no longer being avail-
able to long-term unemployed workers in states with sustained high 
unemployment (ETA 2012).
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Recognizing the importance of helping individuals fi nd jobs, in 
particular the long-term unemployed, and ensuring that they continue 
to meet all eligibility requirements, the EUC program was modifi ed 
in 2012 to require all new EUC claimants to receive reemployment 
services, and reemployment and eligibility assessments (ETA n.d.-g). 
This is the reason the EB proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget 
would have required reemployment services and eligibility assess-
ments for all EB claimants.
Reemployment
The increases in long-term unemployment, average duration, 
and exhaustion rates demonstrate the need for strategies designed to 
assist with reemployment eff orts for individuals who become unem-
ployed. Building on the initiative that began in 2005 in a few states 
and national implementation in 2012 for individuals receiving EUC, 
the FY 2017 Obama Budget proposed making the RESEA program a 
permanently authorized program that would have required all states 
to participate and would have provided enhanced funding to enable 
more individuals to be served. For the regular UI program, the one-
third of new claimants who would have been identifi ed31 as the most 
likely to be long-term unemployed and in need of reemployment ser-
vices would have been required to participate in RESEAs as a condi-
tion of eligibility for UI benefi ts.  
Recognizing the importance of helping transitioning veterans 
fi nd employment in the civilian labor force, the FY 2017 Obama 
Budget also proposed requiring all new claimants for the Unemploy-
ment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers program32 to participate 
in RESEAs as a condition of eligibility for UI benefi ts.  
The FY 2017 budget included another proposal designed to 
encourage reemployment—wage insurance. Particularly for workers 
transitioning to new occupations, new jobs might pay signifi cantly 
less than the jobs individuals had prior to becoming unemployed. 
To provide a safety net to such workers and to encourage their swift 
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reemployment, this wage insurance proposal would have been avail-
able to individuals who had been working for at least three years with 
their prior employer. If their new job paid less than $50,000 per year, 
workers would have received a payment equal to half the diff erence 
between their prior and new annual wage, up to $10,000 over a period 
of two years.
Short-Time Compensation
The experience during the Great Recession highlighted the 
importance of helping workers to keep their jobs. While many states 
did avail themselves of the STC-related funding opportunities in the 
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, and a few 
states created new STC programs, not all did. Although there are a 
variety of explanations, one of the most meaningful is timing. To 
implement a new program requires an extensive time commitment. 
In 2012 and 2013, states had limited capacity to take on new initia-
tives, given the high workload and the complex modifi cations to the 
EUC program that they had to administer, among other reasons. Since 
economic conditions improved signifi cantly after recovery from the 
Great Recession, states were in a much better position to consider 
commencing STC programs or improving existing ones. For this rea-
son, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included proposals to give states an 
additional two years of federal reimbursement of STC benefi t costs 
and two more years to apply for and receive STC grants. In addition, 
there was a proposal to make state STC benefi t costs subject to 50 
percent federal reimbursement whenever the state triggered on the 
EB program.
Integrity
Despite states’ best eff orts, many challenges remain to prevent 
improper payments. The FY 2017 Obama Budget included a set of 
highly technical proposals related to benefi t integrity that built on 
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recent enactments. They were designed to provide states with addi-
tional resources to dedicate to this purpose and to ensure that states 
used all of the tools at their disposal to combat this issue. Specifi cally, 
they would have:
• allowed states that contracted out all information technology 
functions to use the Treasury Off set Program for benefi t over-
payment recovery;
• required states to use an electronic system to transmit infor-
mation with employers to obtain information needed to deter-
mine benefi t eligibility;
• required states to use the National Directory of New Hires to 
fi nd individuals who continued to claim benefi ts after return-
ing to work and to require penalties on employers that did not 
report their new hires;
• allowed the USDOL to require that states whose poor pro-
gram performance required creation of corrective action plans 
to dedicate specifi ed amounts of their administrative grants 
to implementing those plans, and to provide awards or incen-
tives to states with excellent performance;
• required states to use UI penalty and interest funds for UI 
administration with a portion dedicated to program integrity 
activities;
• required states to cross-match UI claim information with the 
Prisoner Update Processing System to fi nd individuals who 
were claiming benefi ts while incarcerated; and
• allowed states to use up to 5 percent of recovered overpay-
ments or delinquent employer contributions collected for in-
tegrity purposes rather than for future benefi t payments. 
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CONCLUSION
As is evident from this brief description and analysis, the FY 2017 
Obama Budget included an ambitious set of UI legislative proposals 
that focused on many of the most profoundly meaningful aspects of 
the program. Opinions will certainly vary about those proposals from 
both a substantive policy perspective as well as from an ideological 
perspective. However, when considering UI’s philosophical under-
pinnings, it should be clear that many of these proposals could bring 
the current UI program into better alignment with its foundational 
principles, given the economic, societal, and technological changes 
that have occurred during the more than 80 years since the inception 
of the UI program in 1935. Moreover, by raising the profi le of some 
crucial issues and setting forth a comprehensive plan for addressing 
them, public dialogue and debate might yet be encouraged and result 
in permanent positive reforms to the UI program.
Notes
The opinions expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone. They do not 
purport to refl ect the offi  cial position or views of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. Many thanks are given to Daniel Hays in the Division of Legislation 
of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Offi  ce of Unemployment Insurance for 
his assistance with research. Thanks also to Ed Dullaghan in the Division of 
Fiscal and Actuarial Services of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Offi  ce of 
Unemployment Insurance for creating and updating all of the fi gures.
1.  Although this overview addresses many key aspects of the UI program, 
it mainly focuses on the aspects of the program pertinent to the reform 
proposals discussed in this paper. It is not comprehensive and is intended
to provide the information necessary to understand the issues that pres-
ently exist and how the proposals were intended to address them. 
2.  Washington State does not determine UI eligibility based on earn-
ing wages equal to or exceeding a specifi ed amount. Instead, state 
law requires an individual to have at least 680 hours of base period 
employment. 
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3.  Following the enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, 23 states enacted new or modifi ed existing alternative base periods. 
4.  Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania levy nominal UI taxes on work-
ers under certain limited circumstances. In Alaska, the tax rate is equal 
to 27 percent of the average benefi t cost rate, but not less than 0.5 per-
cent or more than 1.0 percent of taxable wages. In New Jersey, the tax 
rate is 0.3825 percent. Depending on the adequacy of the fund balance 
in a given year, Pennsylvania employees pay contributions ranging 
from 0.0 percent to 0.08 percent of total gross covered wages earned in 
employment.  
5.  Until June 2011, the FUTA tax was 6.2 percent and the eff ective FUTA 
tax rate was 0.8 percent. A 0.2 percent “surtax” was originally added 
in 1985 to help the federal accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
(UTF) pay back their advances from the General Fund of the U.S. Trea-
sury. Between advances to states and federal benefi t spending during the 
Great Recession, the federal accounts in the UTF ran out of funds and 
had to borrow to meet all obligations. 
6.  At the onset of the program, the FUTA tax was 1.0 percent on total wages
with an eff ective rate of 0.1 percent. In 1939, the FUTA taxable wage 
base was set at $3,000, which exceeded the annual wages of 98 percent 
of workers. According to USDOL estimates, FUTA taxable wages in 
2015 represented less than 17 percent of total wages in the United States. 
7.  States may use other state funds or may borrow from other sources 
to pay UI benefi ts. During the Great Recession, Colorado, Illinois, 
Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas borrowed via bonding. On 
December 31, 2013, the outstanding bond amount for these states was 
$9.725 billion. 
8.  If on November 10 of the year in which on a second consecutive Janu-
ary 1 a state has a remaining outstanding Title XII advance balance, the 
state’s FUTA credits will begin to be reduced in the subsequent year to 
repay the outstanding debt.  
9.  The state must apply for and be found eligible for relief from tax credit 
reduction in the form of avoidance or a cap on reduction (26 U.S.C. 
3302 and Social Security Act, Section 901(d)(1)). 
10.  There is an incentive in 20 C.F.R. 606.32 for states to maintain a solvent 
account in the UTF. Without meeting the funding goals prescribed by 
this regulation, any Title XII advance that a state receives is interest 
accruing. 
11.  The program was created in the Federal-State Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1970. 
12.  FUTA revenue in the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account 
is used for this purpose. 
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13.  See section 3304(a)(1) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and sec-
tion 303(a)(2) of the Social Security Act. 
14.  See P.L. 97-248, 96 STAT.409. 
15.  See P.L. 102-318, 106 STAT.298. 
16. It is important to note that the workers who would not have been laid 
off  (typically those with most seniority) experience a reduction in their 
income that they otherwise wouldn’t have. However, the fact that most 
states require labor union approval of STC plans if the workplace is sub-
ject to a collective bargaining agreement demonstrates the overall sup-
port for STC because it helps workers (typically the most junior) avoid 
becoming unemployed. Anecdotal evidence indicates that workplace 
morale often improves when an agreement is reached to avoid layoff s by 
reducing hours and off ering STC.  
17. STC payments are treated like unemployment compensation (UC) pay-
ments. Thus, they are deducted from an individual’s maximum benefi t 
amount during a given benefi t year, which would reduce the number 
of weeks of UC available should the individual later become unem-
ployed. Similarly, under permanent law, STC payments are “charged” to 
employers’ accounts for purposes of determining their experience-rated 
state UC tax rate in the same way UC payments are charged. 
18. Federal laws and executive orders establish requirements for reducing 
improper payments in Federal programs. For additional information, see 
http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/improp_pay.asp (accessed March 
24, 2018). 
19. The fi gures contained in this section were prepared by staff  in the Divi-
sion of Fiscal and Actuarial Services utilizing ETA and BLS data. 
20. The AHCM is calculated by dividing the Calendar Year Reserve Ratio 
(or “Trust Fund Balance as a percent of Taxable Wages”) by the Average 
High Cost Rate. 
21.  The material in this section draws on USDOL (2017b). 
22.  To a certain extent, this is an inherent design feature of insurance. It 
generally is not expected that premiums would cover the full cost of the 
benefi ts. However, it is widely acknowledged that excessive levels of 
socialized costs due to ineff ective charging and insuffi  cient maximum 
tax rates to refl ect employer experience with unemployment result in 
some employers paying for a smaller portion of benefi ts than others. 
Also, it is important to note that for UI purposes, certain entities are 
permitted to self-insure. State or local governmental entities, 501(c)(3) 
nonprofi t organizations, and Indian tribes may opt to reimburse benefi t 
costs rather than be assessed a contribution rate. 
23.  Regular benefi ts are paid at the beginning of a spell of unemployment. 
This is in contrast to programs like EB, which are available to individu-
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als who exhaust entitlement to regular benefi ts in states whose unem-
ployment rate exceeds certain levels. 
24.  Consistent with the insurance principle of the UI program, states have 
been allowed to have “non-charged” UI benefi t payments when the 
employer is not at fault for the spell of unemployment. A typical reason 
has been when benefi t payments are made to individuals who quit for 
good personal cause. 
25.  Older workers increasingly are taking part-time “bridge jobs” after they 
leave their career jobs and before they fully retire. 
26.  Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Section 3304(a)(8). 
27.  Since enactment of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, the Employ-
ment Service has been incorporated into the one-stop career center 
system. For additional information, see http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=reports (accessed March 24, 
2018). 
28. Although it was expected that the proposal to improve federal solvency 
would generally obviate the need for General Revenue, during severe 
recessions that might not have been the case, and such funds would have 
become available under this EB proposal. 
29. P.L. 119-252, http://www.oui.doleta.gov/dmstree/pl/pl_110-252.pdf 
(accessed March 24, 2018). 
30. Although EUC eventually was funded with General Revenue, federal 
EB costs continued to be funded by FUTA revenue in the EUC Account. 
When those funds were depleted, the federal accounts in the UTF bor-
rowed from the U.S. Treasury to meet its obligations. 
31.  Federal law presently requires states to operate the worker profi ling 
and reemployment services program, which identifi es claimants likely 
to exhaust benefi ts and need reemployment services to fi nd work, and 
requires such individuals to participate in those services as a condition 
of UI eligibility. 
32.  Since state UI programs do not cover individuals who work for the fed-
eral government, there are separate federal UI programs to provide ben-
efi ts to such workers when they become unemployed. States administer 
these programs under an agreement with the USDOL. One such pro-
gram is Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers. 
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